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Abstract 
Is it acceptable and moral to sacrifice a few people’s lives to save many others? 
Research on moral dilemmas in psychology, experimental philosophy and 
neuropsychology has shown that respondents judge utilitarian personal moral actions 
(footbridge dilemma) as less appropriate than equivalent utilitarian impersonal moral 
actions (trolley dilemma). Accordingly, theorists (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) have 
argued that judgments of appropriateness in personal moral dilemmas are more 
emotionally salient and cognitively demanding (taking more time to be rational) than 
impersonal moral dilemmas. Our novel findings show an effect of psychological 
accessibility (driven by partial contextual information; Kahneman, 2003) on utilitarian 
moral behavior and response time for rational choices. Enhanced accessibility of 
utilitarian outcomes through comprehensive information about moral actions and 
consequences boosted utility maximization in moral choices, with rational choices 
taking less time. Moreover, our result suggests that previous results indicating 
emotional interference, with rational choices taking more time to make, may have been 
artifacts of presenting partial information. 
  
Keywords: utility, moral dilemmas, accessibility, judgments, rational choice 
 
 
 
 
 
Utilitarian Accessibility in Moral Judgments  
 
3 
 
 
Is it acceptable and moral to sacrifice a few people’s lives to save many others? ‘It is 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong’. 
With these words, the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1789) defined the nature 
of utilitarian actions: behaviors judged as morally right only by virtue of their outcome 
(Bentham, 1789). From the utilitarian point of view, Bentham (1789; 1948) noted that 
is acceptable to sacrifice a small number of people’s lives to save a greater number 
because this results in greater utility (happiness) overall. In contrast, deontologists 
(e.g., Kant, 1785; 1959) have argued that it is not acceptable, because living is a 
fundamental right for everyone, and no one has the right to take that from anyone, 
regardless of any benefits that may arise from doing so. Research in psychology, 
experimental philosophy and neuropsychology has revealed that moral judgments of 
the appropriateness of life-saving actions are not strictly utilitarian, but are influenced 
by the type of involvement (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 
2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Mikhail, 2007, 2009; Thomson, 1985). In particular, 
directly taking action (‘personal action’) in scenarios (one person pushing another from 
the bridge in order to save several others, in the ‘footbridge dilemma’) was judged to 
be less appropriate than indirectly taking action (‘impersonal action’) (a person 
‘switching a mechanism’, killing one person in order to save several others, in the 
‘trolley dilemma’). 
Various theoretical attempts have been made to account for these behavioral 
differences in response to personal and impersonal dilemmas. Traditionally, moral- 
psychology theorists have focused on the role of emotional processes in moral 
judgments (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 
2002; Nakamura, 2013; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). For instance, Greene and 
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colleagues (2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002) found that respondents spent more time 
judging the appropriateness of personal moral actions than of impersonal actions. This 
result seems puzzling and surprising from a strict utilitarian perspective, given that the 
two dilemma types offer identical utility. 
In an attempt to provide an account of the above result in terms of the relationship 
between implicit and explicit cognitive processes in moral judgments, Greene and 
colleagues (2001) proposed a dual-process theory of moral behavior, stating that 
moral judgments can be driven via both (i) implicit, fast, affective and (ii) explicit, slow, 
controlled psychological mechanisms (Forbes & Grafman, 2010; Greene et al., 2001; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Moore, Clark, 
& Kane, 2008). In Greene’s view, the affective system is likely to be activated by 
‘personal’ moral considerations, while the cognitive system might favor utilitarian 
consequences and thus rational thinking. This proposal has been supported by 
behavioral experiments (Greene et al., 2001), testing utilitarian choices in a morally 
challenging situation, in which a trolley is riding a rail and - if it proceeds on its way - 
five people tied on the track will be killed. The participants were presented with two 
different opportunities: in the trolley dilemma, to hit a switch and make the trolley 
change its track, killing one person tied to another rail, or to do nothing and let the five 
people die; similarly, in the footbridge dilemma, to push a person off the bridge and 
onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley, saving the five people 
tied up onto the track, or to do nothing and let the five people die. The results show 
that people judge as appropriate sacrificing one person for the sake of five in the trolley 
dilemma, but judge as inappropriate sacrificing one person in order to save five in the 
footbridge dilemma.  
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According to the moral dual-process model, what makes the difference between the 
two types of dilemma is the degree of personal affective and cognitive involvement. 
Consistent with this model, participants took longer to accept (i.e. judge as 
appropriate) personal moral actions that would maximize utilitarian outcomes (rational 
moral judgments) than to reject such actions as inappropriate (irrational moral 
judgments) (Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002). Greene and colleagues 
(2001) argued that when participants faced personal (footbridge-like) dilemmas in 
which one’s moral rules conflict with the outcomes, both affective and cognitive 
systems were recruited. The former would favor rejecting the actions, for the sake of 
an internal moral principle; the latter would favor endorsing them, in the name of 
rationality. The conflict, then, between the two systems would result in increased 
response time when a participant faced a footbridge-like dilemma and made a rational 
judgment. 
Crucially, almost all experimental studies based on Thomson’s (1985) paradigm 
have tended to use abstract moral dilemmas framed in such a way that the 
accessibility (Kahneman, 2003) of moral utilitarian actions and consequences is 
reduced, asking respondents to apparently put themselves into those cognitively 
challenging situations.  
For example: 
“…The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to hit a switch near 
the tracks that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, where the lone 
workman’s large body will stop the trolley. The lone workman will die if you do 
this, but the five workmen will be saved.  
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Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the five 
workmen?  
Yes/No” 
 
There are two striking issues in these commonly used descriptions of abstract moral 
dilemmas. First, although there is an explicit contextual account about the moral action 
and utilitarian consequences of saving the five workmen at the expense of the lone 
workman, there is no corresponding account of saving the life of the lone workman at 
the expense of the workmen. Hence, only 50% of the moral scenario is contextually 
available – a framing effect (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), where 
different representations of outcomes make some features of the situation more 
accessible and others less accessible, leading to systematically different decisions. 
Second, the appropriateness question itself further adds to this framing effect by 
requiring an assessment of appropriateness on only one of the two possible moral 
actions (“Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the 
five workmen?”). Given the well-established role of contextual framing effects in 
decision-making (FeldmanHall, Mobbs, Evans, Hiscox, Navrady, & Dalgleish, 2012; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), findings and interpretation of utilitarian moral decision-
making based on these commonly used scenarios are to be treated with caution. 
For the current study, in an attempt to increase the accessibility of moral utilitarian 
actions and consequences – utilitarian accessibility – we have developed and de-
biased abstract moral scenarios and questions used by researchers in psychology, 
experimental philosophy and neuroscience.  
For example: 
Utilitarian Accessibility in Moral Judgments  
 
7 
 
“….The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to hit a switch near 
the tracks that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, where the lone 
workman’s large body will stop the trolley. The lone workman will die if you do 
this, but the five workmen will be saved. The only way to save the life of the 
lone workman is not to hit the switch near the tracks. The five workmen will 
die if you do this, but the lone workman will be saved. 
 
Choose the option which is more appropriate for you: 
Sacrifice one workman in order to save five workmen 
or 
Sacrifice five workmen in order to save one workman” 
 
First, we offer a new experimental approach to study moral dilemmas by eliminating 
confounding variables (see, e.g., McGuire et al., 2009), allowing the footbridge 
dilemma to be impersonal (switching mechanism) and for the trolley dilemma to be 
personal (to push the worker on the track). Second, to account for utilitarian 
accessibility we offer presentations of moral dilemmas by using both partial textual 
descriptions (commonly employed in utilitarian moral research) and novel full textual 
descriptions of moral actions and their consequences. Third, we further reduce 
differences in utilitarian accessibility by offering a choice question of appropriateness, 
which accounts for both utilitarian alternatives (and their consequences) in moral 
actions (rational and irrational choice). Accordingly, the results of the current study 
were expected to reveal an enhanced behavioral rationality for moral dilemmas with 
accessible utilitarian content, where a full textual description was provided about the 
initial state, action, and the consequences of the action. 
Utilitarian Accessibility in Moral Judgments  
 
8 
 
Experiment 
Method 
Participants. 
According to power analysis with a significance level = .05, desired power = .80 and 
medium effect size (f2 = .25), a total sample size of 136 was required. Participants 
were recruited through a recruitment service of online survey panels.  A window of 
seven days was set for data collection; after a week had passed, 299 people (170 
females, 129 males) had taken part, meeting the required sample size. Mean age was 
49 years (SD = 14.07). They took part individually and received a payment of £1. All 
participants were treated in accordance with the ethical standards of the British 
Psychological Society. 
Materials and Design. 
Each participant was given one of eight vignettes to read, involving a moral-
dilemma scenario where the type of dilemma, action involvement, task instructions 
and questions were manipulated. The experiment accounted for utilitarian accessibility 
by presenting descriptive information about the moral dilemmas: (1) by partial text 
description and question only or (2) by full textual description and question, revealing 
all of the possible behavioral actions and consequences of the actions (see the 
supplementary materials).  
An independent measures 222 design was employed, with independent variables 
type of dilemma (trolley dilemma or footbridge dilemma), action involvement (moral 
personal or moral impersonal), and utilitarian accessibility (partial text description and 
question or full text description [displayed information about the initial state, action, 
and consequences of the action] and question). The dependent variables were the 
choice of appropriateness of action (making a rational or irrational choice), study time 
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(reading the scenarios), and response time. Based on the consequentialist theory of 
moral utilitarian judgment, in this experiment we defined a rational choice as one that 
saves the lives of five workmen rather than of another single workman, thereby 
maximizing the utility of the moral action that is taken and minimizing the disutility. The 
order of the response options (rational and irrational) was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Procedure. 
Instructions, scenario and question were presented in an online computer-based 
experiment. Participants were presented with and required to read the instructions and 
one moral-dilemma scenario. Then (after clicking the ‘next’ button), while the moral 
dilemma was still visible, the respondents were presented with a binary choice 
(between actions with rational or irrational utilitarian consequences) and required to 
choose the appropriate option for them.  
Results. 
The effect of the independent variables on choice1 was analyzed. Rational choices 
(choosing the option resulting in one death rather than five) were more commonly 
made when full information was presented and when an impersonal dilemma 
presented (Table 1 and Figure 1): a logistic-regression model comprising all the main 
effects and interaction effects explained 38% of variance, RCS2 = .38. The main effects 
of accessibility (partial information vs full information), OR = 31.67, CI.95 = [3.95; 
254.08], and involvement (impersonal vs personal), OR = 0.09, CI.95 = [0.03; 0.31], 
were significant.  However, significant were neither the main effect of dilemma type, 
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OR = 0.55, CI.95 = [0.22; 1.37], nor any of the interaction effects, OR = 1.97, CI.95 = 
[0.35; 10.97] for dilemma by involvement, OR = 0.24, CI.95 = [0.02; 2.56] for dilemma 
by accessibility, OR = 1.79, CI.95 = [0.15; 21.96] for involvement by accessibility, and 
OR = 1.43, CI.95 = [0.07; 29.25] for involvement by accessibility.  Therefore, next a 
model with only the significant main effects of accessibility and involvement was 
analyzed. This explained 36% of variance, RCS2 = .36. The main effects of 
accessibility, OR = 19.26, CI.95 = [10.00; 31.11], and involvement, OR = 0.20, CI.95 = 
[0.10; 0.37], remained significant. The odds of a rational choice were 19.26 times 
larger when a dilemma was presented with full information than when it was presented 
with reduced information. Furthermore, the odds of a rational choice were 0.20 times 
smaller when a dilemma involved a choice of a personal act (pushing the person) than 
when it involved an impersonal act (operating a switch without direct contact with the 
person).  
Study time for a dilemma with full information was longer than when partial 
information was displayed; furthermore, when involvement was impersonal, time was 
longer than when it was personal (Table 2). A 222 analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
showed that the main effects of accessibility (partial vs full information), F(1, 291) = 
13.31, p < .001, 2 = .04, and involvement (impersonal vs personal), F(1, 291) = 5.33, 
p < .05, 2 = .01, were significant, but neither were the main effect of dilemma type nor 
any of the interaction effects, all F < 1, all 2 = .01.   
In contrast, response time for a dilemma with full information was shorter than when 
partial information was displayed (Table 3), t (297) = 5.57, r = .31, p < .001. Further 
analysis examined Greene and colleagues’ (2001) claim that ‘emotional interference’ 
produces longer response time for emotionally incongruent responses. Specifically, 
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the dual-process theory of moral behavior (Greene et al., 2001) predicts longer 
response time for a rational choice in response to a moral dilemma under the condition 
of personal involvement than for a rational choice under the condition of impersonal 
involvement. However, descriptives indicated that response time was longer for 
emotionally incongruent response only under the conditions of partial information 
(Figure 2). In support, we conducted 2222 ANOVA, with choice rationality 
(response to the task) as an additional independent variable. The results show that 
the main effect of accessibility, F(1, 283) = 8.59, p < .01, 2 = .02, and the interaction 
effects of involvement by accessibility, F(1, 283) = 5.48, p < .05, 2 = .01, involvement 
by choice rationality, F(1, 283) = 14.43, p < .001, 2 = .04, and accessibility by choice 
rationality (rational vs irrational choice), F(1, 283) = 6.72, p < .05, 2 = .02, were 
significant. Not significant were the main effects of choice rationality, F(1, 283) = 3.57, 
p > .05, 2 = .01, and involvement and dilemma type, both F < 1, 2 = .00.  Neither 
were the following two-way interaction effects: dilemma type by involvement, dilemma 
type by accessibility, and dilemma type by choice rationality, all F < 1, 2 = .00. Nor 
were the following three-way interaction effects: dilemma type by involvement by 
choice rationality, F(1, 283) = 1.07, p > .05, 2 = .00,  involvement by accessibility by 
choice rationality, F(1, 283) = 1.59, p > .05, 2 = .00, and dilemma type by involvement 
by accessibility and dilemma type by accessibility by choice rationality, both F < 1, 2 
= .00. Neither was the four-way interaction, F < 1, 2 = .00. 
Follow-up simple-effect tests showed that for moral dilemmas with partial 
information, the interaction between involvement and choice rationality was significant, 
F(1, 159) = 15.60, p < .001, 2 = .09. Unsurprisingly, further simple effects within partial 
information revealed that the effect of choice rationality was significant, F(1, 82) = 8.69, 
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p < .01, 2 = .09, when involvement was personal, with rational choices taking more 
time to make (𝑀𝐿𝑛 = 2.81; 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑛 = .38) than irrational (𝑀𝐿𝑛 = 2.16; 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑛 = .61); however, 
when involvement was impersonal, the effect was significant, F(1, 76) = 8.56, p < .01, 
2 = .09, with rational choices taking less time (𝑀𝐿𝑛 = 2.03; 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑛 = .52) than irrational 
(𝑀𝐿𝑛 = 2.51; 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑛 = .84). 
Yet, simple effects showed that for moral dilemmas with full information only the 
effect of choice rationality was significant, F(1, 138) = 10.69, p < .01, 2 = .06, with 
rational choices taking less time (𝑀𝐿𝑛 = 1.79; 𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑛 = .49) than irrational (𝑀𝐿𝑛 = 2.19; 
𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑛 = .46). These findings suggest that any emotional interference, with rational 
choices taking more time to make, appears as an artifact of presenting partial 
information and disappears when full information is presented, with rational choices 
taking less time. 
Discussion 
Our results reveal that variation in utilitarian accessibility produces variation in moral 
choices. In particular, displaying full information regarding moral actions and 
consequences resulted in an increase of rational choices. Moreover, the effect of 
utilitarian accessibility was general in that it occurred across types of involvement (both 
personal and impersonal) and types of dilemma (both trolley and footbridge). Previous 
research (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) found that people took more time to judge an 
action as rational when a moral dilemma was personal. However, type of dilemma and 
involvement were confounded (McGuire et al., 2009), and utilitarian accessibility was 
not manipulated. 
We further examined Greene and colleagues’ (2001) claim that ‘emotional 
interference’ produces longer response time for emotionally incongruent responses. 
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This prediction was only confirmed when participants make a rational choice in 
response to a moral dilemma under the condition of personal involvement (e.g., 
judging it appropriate to push the man off the footbridge in the footbridge dilemma) 
under conditions of partial information. In contrast, with full information presented, 
rational choices were made faster. Therefore, our results suggest that any emotional 
interference, with rational choices taking more time to make, is an artifact of presenting 
partial information and does not happen when full information is presented, with 
rational choices taking less time. Given our results, a more plausible interpretation of 
increased response time with rational answers under conditions of partial information 
is reduced utilitarian accessibility rather than ‘emotional interference’. When decision-
makers are presented with full contextual information about a particular moral action 
and its consequences, the framing effect will be eliminated and mental simulation will 
not entertain other possible outcomes of the scenario (e.g., FeldmanHall et al., 2012). 
Therefore, decision-makers are more vividly confronted with the effect of the action 
(whether personal or impersonal). It is plausible that limited utilitarian accessibility of 
moral actions and consequences results in a psychological uncertainty and 
corresponding mental simulations (compensating for reduced accessibility of moral 
actions and consequences). In contrast, comprehensive information about moral 
actions and consequences may eliminate uncertainty, and boost utility maximization 
in moral choices, with rational choices taking less time. Such an interpretation might 
be accommodated by ‘situation models’ (e.g., Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987), in 
which linguistic descriptions are understood by simulating perceptual and motor 
aspects of those descriptions. Therefore, more complete descriptions may facilitate 
simulations by reducing uncertainty. Moreover, it is well established by behavioral 
science theorists that decision uncertainty induces human irrationality in choice (e.g., 
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Kusev, van Schaik, Ayton, Dent, & Chater, 2009; Kusev, van Schaik, & Aldrovandi, 
2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Our main finding is the effect of utilitarian accessibility on judgment of 
appropriateness and response time. Therefore, we agree with McGuire et al.’s (2009) 
recommendation that “More research needs to be done at a behavioral level in order 
to fine-tune the questions being asked before work identifying the neural correlates of 
moral decision-making can be useful” (p. 580).  
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Footnote 
1Irrational choice was the reference category and rational choice as the response 
category. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1 
Choice as a function of involvement, accessibility and dilemma type  
    Trolley Footbridge  
Involvement Accessibility 
(information) 
Irrational Rational Irrational Rational 
 
Impersonal Partial 6% 7% 8% 5%  
  (19) (21) (23) (14)  
 Full 0% 12% 2% 9%  
  (1) (35) (6) (28)  
Personal Partial 13% 1% 12% 1%  
  (39) (4) (36) (4)  
 Full 2% 10% 4% 8%  
    (5) (29) (11) (24)  
Note.  Figures are percentages with frequencies in brackets.  
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptives for study time by involvement, accessibility and dilemma type  
      Trolley Footbridge 
Involvement Accessibility 
(information) 
Tr M SD M SD 
 
Impersonal Partial T 3.23 0.50 3.29 0.60  
  U 28.43 14.27 31.38 17.28  
 Full T 3.40 0.53 3.43 0.54  
  U 34.55 20.65 36.46 27.16  
Personal Partial T 3.12 0.44 3.15 0.46  
  U 21.63 8.74 25.56 9.85  
  Full T 3.36 0.47 3.35 0.50  
    U 30.01 12.49 32.10 16.86  
Note.  The frequency distribution of study time was positively skewed and this was 
considerably improved by logarithmic transformation. 
Tr: transformation.  T: logarithmically transformed.  U: untransformed (original). 
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Table 3 
Descriptives for response time by involvement, accessibility and dilemma type  
      Trolley Footbridge   
Involvement Accessibility 
(information) 
Tr M SD M SD 
  
Impersonal Partial T 2.28 0.74 2.30 0.76   
  U 13.43 13.88 13.15 9.57   
 Full T 1.85 0.52 1.89 0.54   
  U 7.25 3.92 7.62 4.14   
Personal Partial T 2.16 0.60 2.29 0.63   
  U 10.51 7.25 12.19 8.76   
  Full T 1.85 0.50 1.86 0.50   
    U 7.15 3.53 7.25 3.48   
 
Note.  The frequency distribution of study time was positively skewed and this was 
considerably improved by logarithmic transformation. 
Tr: transformation.  T: logarithmically transformed.  U: untransformed (original). 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Frequencies of rational choices as a function of accessibility, involvement, 
and dilemma type. 
 
Figure 2.  Mean response time as a function of accessibility, involvement, and choice 
rationality (time in seconds). 
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Supplemental materials 
 
In the experimental conditions participants were offered the following scenarios and 
choice options about the appropriateness of action: 
 
A. Moral dilemmas under partial descriptions. 
 
Footbridge, personal, partial description: 
A runaway trolley is heading down the track toward five workmen who will be killed if 
the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the track in 
between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge 
is a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to save the lives of the five 
workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the track below where his 
large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen 
will be saved. 
 
Question: 
Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger on to the track in order to save the 
five workmen?  
 Yes 
 No 
    
 Footbridge, impersonal, partial description:  
A runaway trolley is heading down the track toward five workmen who will be killed if 
the trolley remains on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the track 
between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge 
is a lone workman who is hanging on a rope, painting the bridge. The only way to save 
the lives of the five workmen is to hit a switch, causing the rope to lower the lone 
workman onto the track below, where his large body will stop the trolley. The lone 
workman will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. 
 
Question: 
Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the five 
workmen?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
Trolley, impersonal, partial description: 
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if 
the trolley remains on its present course. On the track extending to the left are five 
railway workmen. On the track extending to the right is a lone railway workman. The 
only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to hit a switch near the tracks that will 
cause the trolley to proceed to the right, where the lone workman’s large body will stop 
the trolley. The lone workman will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved.  
Question: 
Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the five 
workmen?  
 Yes 
 No 
Trolley, personal, partial description: 
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if 
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the trolley remains on its present course. A lone workman just happens to be standing 
near the track and you are there.  The only way to save the lives of the five workmen 
is to push the lone workman so that he falls onto the track, where his large body will 
stop the trolley. The lone workman will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be 
saved. 
  
Question: 
Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger on to the track in order to save the 
five workmen?  
 Yes 
 No 
   
B. Moral dilemmas under full descriptions. 
 
Footbridge, personal, full description: 
A runaway trolley is heading down the track toward five workmen who will be killed if 
the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the track in 
between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge 
is a lone workman who happens to be very large. The only way to save the lives of the 
five workmen is to push the lone workman off the bridge and onto the track below 
where his large body will stop the trolley. The lone workman will die if you do this, but 
the five workmen will be saved. The only way to save the life of the lone workman is 
not to push this workman off the bridge. The five workmen will die if you do this, but 
the lone workman will be saved. 
 
Question: 
Choose the option which is more appropriate for you: 
 Sacrifice one workman in order to save five workmen 
 Sacrifice five workmen in order to save one workman 
 
Footbridge, impersonal, full description: 
A runaway trolley is heading down the track toward five workmen who will be killed if 
the trolley remains on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the track 
between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge 
is a lone workman who is hanging on a rope, painting the bridge. The only way to save 
the lives of the five workmen is to hit a switch, causing the rope to lower the lone 
workman onto the track below, where his large body will stop the trolley. The lone 
workman will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. The only way to 
save the life of the lone workman is not to hit the switch. The five workmen will die if 
you do this, but the lone workman will be saved. 
 
Question: 
Choose the option which is more appropriate for you: 
 Sacrifice one workman in order to save five workmen 
 Sacrifice five workmen in order to save one workman 
 
Trolley, impersonal, full description: 
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if 
the trolley remains on its present course. On the track extending to the left are five 
railway workmen. On the track extending to the right is a lone railway workman. The 
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only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to hit a switch near the tracks that will 
cause the trolley to proceed to the right, where the lone workman’s large body will stop 
the trolley. The lone workman will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. 
The only way to save the life of the lone workman is not to hit the switch near the 
tracks. The five workmen will die if you do this, but the lone workman will be saved. 
 
Question: 
Choose the option which is more appropriate for you: 
 Sacrifice one workman in order to save five workmen 
 Sacrifice five workmen in order to save one workman 
    
 
Trolley, personal, full description: 
A runaway trolley is heading down the track toward five workmen who will be killed if 
the trolley remains on its present course. A lone workman just happens to be standing 
near the track and you are there. The only way to save the lives of the five workmen 
is to push the lone workman so that he falls onto the track, where his large body will 
stop the trolley. The lone workman will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be 
saved. The only way to save the life of the lone workman is not to push this workman. 
The five workmen will die if you do this, but the lone workman will be saved. 
 
Question: 
Choose the option which is more appropriate for you: 
 Sacrifice one workman in order to save five workmen 
 Sacrifice five workmen in order to save one workman 
 
 
